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In this article I examine class based inequalities in turnout in Britain. I find that these 
inequalities have substantially grown, and that the class divide in participation in now 
greater than the class divide in vote choice between the two main parties. To account for 
class inequalities in turnout I test three main hypotheses to do with policy indifference, 
policy alienation, and social alienation. The results from the British context suggest that the 
social background of political representatives influences the ways in which voters 
participate in the political process, and that the decline of elected representatives from 
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Introduction 
In recent years there has been a great deal of concern about declining levels of turnout in 
Britain.2 Much of this research has concentrated on the decline in turnout among young 
people in particular.3 However, young people are not the only social group to have 
experienced a dramatic fall in turnout. In this article I examine the electoral participation of 
the working class. Although it has been well documented that the strength of class voting 
has declined in Britain,4 it is less well documented that class based differences in turnout 
have increased, and that the working class are now much less likely to vote than the middle 
class. 
In 2010 the difference in reported turnout between the working class and salariat was 19 
percentage points, compared to less than just 5 percentage points in 1964. Put into context, 
the difference in reported turnout between the under 30s and the over 60s in 2010 was 21 
percentage points.5 Whereas this ‘age gap’ has received an enormous amount of academic 
and policy attention, with numerous mobilization initiatives launched to try and get young 
people more involved in politics, the ‘class gap’, of a very similar magnitude, has received 
almost no attention at all. And whereas young people tend to grow into older people, and 
turnout tends to increase with the transition to adulthood,6  working class people tend to 
stay working class, as do their children. In the context of rising inequality and stalled social 
mobility the ‘class gap’ in turnout warrants closer attention.  
In this article I examine the sources of working class abstention. I do so with reference to 
some of the key theories of class voting and turnout. Traditionally, two distinctive 
approaches have dominated studies on class voting. The first approach holds that political 
cleavages are shaped by ‘bottom-up’ factors to do with changes in the social structure of 
the electorate.7 According to this ‘class heterogeneity’ perspective rising living standards, 
the spread of affluence, and educational expansion have weakened the distinctiveness of 
                                                          
2 See Clarke et al 2004; Heath 2007; Smets 2012 
3 See Franklin 2004; Sloam 2014 
4 Evans and Tilley 2012a, 2012b; Heath 2015 
5 Data from the British Election Studies. 
6 Smets 2015 
7 See Evans and de Graff 2013 for a review 
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social classes and blurred class boundaries leading to a decline in class voting.8 Although this 
interpretation has been challenged on a number of grounds;9 with respect to turnout 
specifically the blurring of class boundaries would appear ill-equipped to explain in a 
straightforward way why classes have become more distinctive in terms of their turnout 
patterns, since if anything educational expansion should increase turnout as citizens now 
possess the political resources and skills that help them to deal with the complexities of 
politics without reliance on party cues.10  
In recent years there has been a ‘fundamental shift’ in the study of political participation to 
acknowledge the critical role of political elites, both in terms of stimulating (or at times, 
depressing) voter turnout,11  and mobilising (or demobilising) class divisions.12 As Przeworski 
puts it, ‘individual voting behaviour is an effect of the activities of political parties’.13 And as 
Evans and Tilley conclude: strategic moves by political actors are capable of generating 
pronounced changes in the social bases of party support over relatively short periods of 
time.14 According to this ‘top-down’ perspective voters do not behave blindly, but respond 
to the structure of the political choice between the parties they face. The agent of change in 
this approach is clearly political, rather than social structural – even if political strategy is 
often shaped - at least in part - by social conditions.15 
Drawing on this political choice literature I investigate three key hypotheses which may help 
to shed light on class based inequalities in turnout. Existing research has shown that 
contextual factors such as electoral competitiveness,16  and policy distinctiveness affect 
turnout.17 Voters are constrained by the electoral choices they are offered, and as Leighley 
and Nagler observe, from a self-interest perspective it would be more foolish to sit out an 
election where the choices differ than to sit out one in which the choices are not choices, 
                                                          
8 See for example Franklin 1985, 1992 
9 Evans and Tilley (2013: 112) conclude that this ‘structural dissolution’ thesis has minimal explanatory power 
for the decline of class voting in the UK. 
10 See Dalton 1984, 2007 
11 See Leighley and Nagler 2014 
12 Evans and Tilley 2012a, Evans and van de Graaf 2013 
13 Przeworski 1985, 100-101 
14 Evans and Tilley 2012, 159 
15 See Kitschelt 1994, 1995 
16 See Cox and Munger 1989 
17 See Leighley and Nagler 2014 
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but echoes.18 Previous research has tended to examine the structure of this choice in policy 
terms, most commonly understood in relation to parties’ position on left-right issues. When 
there are clear ideological differences between the parties there is greater incentive to vote 
than when there are only minor differences, in which case it does not matter so much which 
party wins. In the British context Heath shows that voters’ perceptions of how much 
difference there is between the parties influences much of the temporal variation in turnout 
over time.19  
Ideological distinctiveness also has clear resonance for class voting and the political 
participation of the working class. The rationale for this dates back to Lipset et al’s early 
assertion that the working class tend to prefer redistributive policies, and so they vote for 
parties on the left, whereas the middle class try to resist these claims and so vote for parties 
on the right.20 Similarly, Przeworski and Sprague state that when parties of the left pursue 
‘supraclass strategies’, some workers will respond by abstaining.21 In the US, Weakliem and 
Heath suggest that as the Democrats moved to the centre of the political spectrum, class 
differences in turnout increased.22 Accordingly if parties differ in their policy outlook on left-
right issues the incentives to vote (and vote along class lines) are stronger than if the parties 
stand for much the same policy outlook.  
Recent research has shown that the strength of the class-party association in the UK is 
associated with policy difference between the two major parties. According to Evans and 
Tilley “when there is ideological convergence the strength of the signals from parties to 
voters is weakened and the motivation for choosing parties on interest/ideological grounds 
derived from class position is reduced, and vice versa”.23 Although there is some evidence 
that ideological convergence between the Labour and Conservative parties has reduced the 
incentives to vote along class lines since the 1970s it is less clear why ideological 
convergence should have a greater impact on turnout among the working class than it does 
among the middle class, and so create unequal turnout patterns.  
                                                          
18 Leighley and Nagler 2014 
19 Heath 2007 
20 Lipset et al 1954 
21 Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 61-4 
22 Weakliem and Heath 1999 
23 Evans and Tilley 2012a, 144 
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A useful way for thinking about how parties’ policy positions may influence turnout is put 
forward by Zipp, who conceptualized individuals' distance from candidates in each 
presidential election as resulting in alienation (the distance between an individual's 
preferred policy position and the closest candidate's policy position) and indifference (the 
difference in distance between the respondent's preferred policy position and the policy 
position of each of the candidates).24  According to this perspective an individual will be 
more likely to vote when offered policy choices that match more closely the individual's 
preferences, and when parties take more distinctive policy positions. When parties' policy 
positions are not close to those of the individual, then the resulting alienation of the 
individual results in lower probability of voting; and when candidates' policy positions are 
equally appealing or unappealing to an individual, the resulting indifference results in lower 
probability of voting.25 
In the US context Plane and Gershtenson find that individuals are less likely to vote when 
they feel indifferent to or alienated from candidates' ideological positions.26 Using data from 
the 1988-1992 Senate elections, they report that alienation has a greater potential effect on 
citizens' turnout decisions than indifference.27 More recently, Leighley and Nagler show that 
poorer people in the US tend to see less difference between the policy platforms of 
candidates than wealthier people, and are least likely to see candidates as offering 
meaningful choices on issues.28 They argue that the poor cannot respond to policy 
differences that they do not see, and that turnout among the poor will not increase unless 
one or both of the major parties offers them a distinctive and compelling choice.  
Building on these arguments I examine the extent to which policy representation influences 
class-based inequalities in turnout in Britain. Thus in class terms, when the Labour party 
puts forward a left wing policy position the working class may be more likely to vote, and 
when Labour adopts a more right wing policy agenda the working class may become 
‘alienated’ and so abstain. Early work in the British context has suggested such a possibility. 
Writing after the 1997 election, Heath and Taylor speculated that Labour’s move to the 
                                                          
24 Zipp 1985. 
25 See Leighley and Nagler 2014 
26 Plane and Gershtenson 2004 
27 See also Adams, Dow and Merrill 2006 
28 Leighley and Nagler 2014, 141-143 
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centre may have alienated some working class voters, and that the working class were less 
likely to say that the Labour party represented working class interests after 1997 than they 
had done previously.29 Denver and Hands report that turnout was particularly low in safe 
Labour seats,30 and more recently, Evans and Tilley show that abstention among multiply 
disadvantaged groups, with low education, low income and high unemployment has 
increased since 2001 – perhaps as a consequence of the perception that Labour is less 
responsive to the concerns of the working class and the poor.31  
The idea of indifference and alienation also has clear social implications. A voter’s sense of 
indifference or alienation towards political parties may also be shaped by the extent to 
which parties represent them socially, as well as politically. In exploring this possibility I 
draw a distinction between the structure of political choices based on policy or ‘substantive’ 
representation and political choices based on social or ‘descriptive’ representation.32  
Whereas the political representation of women and ethnic minorities in parliament has 
been on the increase in Britain over the last few years; the representation of other social 
groups, particularly the working classes has been declining.33  The number of working class 
MPs within the Labour party has shrunk, and the candidates that they put forward for 
elections are increasingly drawn from a narrow range of middle class occupations. These 
changes have had a substantial impact on the relative popularity of the party among 
working class voters, even controlling for a host of other factors commonly associated with 
class voting.34 Building on this idea in this article I examine whether social representation 
also matters for turnout. As Labour has become more ‘middle class’ have the working class 
become more alienated from the political process, resulting in higher levels of abstention?  
The social representation of working class MPs 
Politicians often talk about their class backgrounds and many campaigns prominently 
highlight stories about how candidates were raised in poor or working class families.35 The 
                                                          
29 Heath and Taylor 1999 
30 Denver and Hands 1997 
31 Evans and Tilley 2011 
32 Pitkin 1967 
33 See Heath 2010 
34 See Heath 2015 
35 See Carnes and Sadin 2015 on the US context. Recent examples in the British context include Sadiq Khan 
who spoke about being the son of a bus driver during the Labour Party Mayoral candidate election campaign 
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social class of politicians is featured in political advertising, stump speeches, election 
leaflets, and is fodder for political pundits.36 Indeed, political reporting in the media is often 
highly personalised – making references to politicians’ upbringing and family background,37  
though it is a matter of some debate whether it has become more personalised over time.38 
As a result, knowledge about candidate characteristics is probably more evenly distributed 
than the notoriously skewed distribution of policy information.39 And whether they realize it 
or not, people frequently use social class stereotypes to make judgements about others 
based on class markers like clothing, occupation, accent and behaviour.40 
In recent years a growing body of work has shown, at least as far as voters are concerned, 
descriptive – or social representation matters, and all else being equal, people with a given 
social characteristic prefer candidates or leaders who share that characteristic.41 As 
Johnston et al. argue "the more an agent resembles oneself the more he or she might be 
expected reflexively to understand and act on one's own interests”.42  Indeed, in the US 
context Carnes presents striking evidence that in the House of Representatives, legislators’ 
class backgrounds have an independent effect on how they vote on economic policies, 
especially on the issues seen as most important to the material welfare of working-class 
Americans.43 More generally, sociodemographic dissimilarity with a political figure tends to 
decrease a voter's expected utility from the election of that person.44 Gathering information 
on candidates' and parties' policy positions and coming up with an opinion of one's own is a 
more costly activity than observing the social characteristics of candidates and party 
leaders.45 The social background of politicians thus offers a “low-information short-cut to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Caroline Flint who spoke about being raised in a single parent family on benefits during the Labour Party 
deputy leader campaign. 
36 Sadin 2011 
37 See Langer 2007 
38 See Karvonen 2010 
39 See Cutler 2002 
40 See for example, Fiske et al. 1999; Giles and Sassoon 1983; Lott and Saxon 2002 
41 See Campbell and Cowley 2014 
42 Johnston et al. 1992 
43 Carnes 2012 
44 Cutler 2002 
45 See Downs 1957; Popkin 1991 
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estimating a candidate's policy preferences... because the voter observes the relationship 
between these traits and real-life behavior as part of his daily experience".46  
Evidence in the British context suggests that the class background of candidates sends 
particularly strong social signals to voters. For example, Campbell and Cowley ran a series of 
survey experiments designed to investigate the British public's reactions to wealthy (or not 
so wealthy) candidates.47 They conclude that everyone seemed put off by wealthy 
candidates, but that the working class are put off more, and the effects are strongest when 
it comes to the candidate’s perceived approachability. In addition Cowley reports that 
working class respondents gave more support to the idea of increasing the number of 
working class MPs in parliament than women did to increasing the number of women 
MPs.48 
It has long been recognised that citizens’ images of the social group character of parties 
affects partisanship.49 The mere awareness of an out-group is sufficient to stimulate in-
group favouritism, and the possibility of social comparison generates ‘spontaneous’ 
intergroup competition.50 Social cues can thus be an incredibly powerful source of 
identification. In a series of classic experiments on group identity, Tafjet and Tuner present 
evidence that as long as minimal conditions existed for in-group identification, subjects 
were prepared to give relatively less to themselves when the award (either in points or 
money) was to be divided between self and an anonymous member of the in-group, as 
compared with dividing with an anonymous member of the out-group.51  The implications of 
this is that social identification can over-ride material self-interest. Indeed, the idea that 
social similarity effects judgements and behaviour has a long history in the social psychology 
literature. As far back as 1958 Heider argued that interpersonal similarity promotes a sense 
of ‘‘belongingness,” or closeness.52 Accordingly, interpersonal attraction, understanding and 
trust tends to be greater within than between groups. Subsequent research has found that 
                                                          
46 Popkin 1991, 63 
47 Campbell and Cowley 2014 
48 Cowley 2013 
49 See Green, Palmquist, and Shickler 2002; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991. 
50 Tajfel and Turner 1986, 17 
51 Tafjet and Tuner 1986 
52 Heider 1958 
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people tend to like similar others more than dissimilar ones,53 and are typically more 
emotionally invested in close than distant others.54  
In the 1960s Labour politicians from working class backgrounds occupied prominent 
positions within the party and even middle class politicians, such as Wilson, projected 
themselves as ‘a man of the people’ and affected a ‘studied working class accent.’ Writing in 
the Guardian John Mullan reports that “Wilson’s Huddersfield accent was disappearing 
during the 1940s and 50s, but mysteriously returned after he became Labour leader in 1963 
- a useful contrast to Alec Douglas Home's strangled toff's drawl.”55  Data from the BES in 
1964 shows that 54% of respondents described Labour as ‘very’ working class and 28% as 
‘fairly’ working class, compared to less than 1% who described Labour as ‘very’ middle class. 
The social identity of the party was thus very strong, and the fact that there were so many 
working class politicians within the party helped to cement this identity. Labour was not just 
a party for the working class but was also a party of the working class.  
In response to changing social conditions, and the contraction of the traditional working 
class sector, the Labour party sought to rebrand its party image in the 1980s and make itself 
more attractive to the growing middle class: it recruited candidates from middle class 
occupations;56 and these candidates tended to be parachuted into safe seats, gain 
promotion quickly,57 and occupy visible positions during campaigns. As the number of 
working class MPs within the Labour party ranks declined the strength of the working class 
social signal that they send voters has weakened. The main parties have thus become far 
less socially distinctive – and in the eyes of many voters now resemble rival middle class 
‘management teams’.58 As a result, Ford and Goodwin argue that voters have become fed 
up with the political class as a whole, and the working class in particular have become more 
alienated from the political system than ever before.59 
                                                          
53 See for example Berscheid 1985; Byrne 1971; Byrne, Clore, and Worchel 1966; Newcomb 1956 
54 See for example Andersen et al. 1998; Aron et al 1991 
55 http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/1999/jun/18/features11.g22 
56 Quinn 2004 
57 Allen 2013 
58 Ford and Goodwin 2014, 127 
59 Ford and Goodwin 2014 
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The rise of the so-called ‘career politician’ – which has received a great deal of attention in 
the national media – has led to the widespread view that politicians have become 
increasingly detached from the lives of ordinary voters. Indeed, in recent years (well-off) 
MPs have frequently displayed an astonishing lack of awareness about what life is like for 
low income families and people living on benefits, from claiming that it is impossible to raise 
a family on an MP’s salary of £67,000 per year, to saying that they would never send their 
children to a state school. In an outspoken attack Lord O’Donnell, the former head of the 
Civil Service said there were still “too many people in politics who just don’t get it” and that 
parliament needed to become more diverse by recruiting ‘people who’ve got more 
experience of the world, not just being in politics all their lives.’60 These concerns have also 
been openly expressed within the Labour party; Hazel Blears, the former Labour cabinet 
minister, said MPs are out of touch with voters because they have little experience of life 
outside the “political bubble” in Westminster,61 and Simon Danczuk, one of the few 
remaining working class Labour MPs, claimed the party had been hijacked by a metropolitan 
elite.62 Indeed, in 2012 Labour launched an explicit search for more working-class 
candidates, to be headed by Jon Trickett, the Shadow Cabinet Office Minister, and its 
National Executive Committee changed party rules so that selection panels had to take 
social class into account, as they already do race and sex.63 
The lack of working class representation in parliament may have serious implications for 
how people perceive political parties and participate in the political process. Working class 
voters may feel more socially distant from middle class politicians and consequently more 
socially alienated from the parties that the MPs represent. If voters attach greater utility to 
having someone ‘like them’ in office and feel closer to elected representatives who share 
their social background, then they may also be more willing to vote and turnout at the polls 
when there is a party that embodies their social background. To investigate these claims I 
test three main hypotheses. Firstly, drawing on the idea of ‘policy indifference’ I examine 
whether class inequalities in turnout are shaped by the policy distinctiveness of the two 







63 Cowley 2013 
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main parties. Secondly, drawing on the idea of ‘policy alienation’ I examine whether class 
inequalities in turnout are shaped by the policy position of the Labour party. Whereas policy 
convergence may breed indifference among both the working class and the middle class, 
the policy position of the Labour party may have a much greater effect on the turnout of the 
working class, with policy shifts to the right alienating their core working class support. 
Thirdly, I also examine whether class inequalities in turnout are shaped by ‘social alienation’ 
based on the occupational background of elected representatives. Rather than responding 
to policy cues, individuals may respond to the social cues that parties send voters. Thus, 
when a party is full of middle class politicians, working class voters may feel more alienated 
- and socially disconnected from their political representatives and so be less likely to vote. 
And without a strong social signal voters may also be less able to tell which party best 
represents their interests, making the calculus of voting more complex.    
Data and Methods 
To test these hypotheses I analyse a merged dataset, which combines information on 
voters, parties’ policy positions and the occupational background of MPs. The data comes 
from three sources. First, to examine the social characteristics and voting behaviour of 
individuals over time, I use pooled cross-sectional survey data from the British Election 
Studies, 1964 to 2010.64 This series covers thirteen elections and consists of 35,597 
interviews. Secondly, to examine policy representation and the policy platforms of the 
political parties over time, I use Party Manifesto Data from the Manifesto Research Group.65 
And thirdly, to examine social representation and the occupational background of MPs, I use 
data from the Datcube project collated by the EurElite network.66 
The dependent variable is reported turnout in the last general election. Turnout is measured 
by whether respondents reported having voted in the election, or not. The base is all those 
on the electoral register. Although survey estimates of turnout tend to over-report official 
turnout,67 the BES survey estimates of non-voting closely follow the official data.68 The key 
independent variable is social class. To measure social class, I use a simplified version of the 
                                                          
64 See Clarke et al 2004 for methodological details 
65 Budge et al 2001 
66 Best and Cotta 2000 
67 Swaddle and Heath 1989 
68 Evans and Tilley 2011 
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Erikson-Goldthorpe seven class schema, which categories people according to their 
occupation.69 Because of concerns over sample size and concerns over how well the skilled 
and semi-skilled categories are actually distinguished, the higher and lower professional 
categories and the working class categories are collapsed. However, the categories which 
are collapsed are not strongly distinguishable with respect to their pattern of party choice or 
level of turnout. Respondents are therefore classified into four class categories: Salariat 
(professional and managerial workers), Petty bourgeois (self-employed, small businessmen 
and farmers), Routine non-manual, and Manual workers (including supervisors/foremen and 
skilled and unskilled workers).  
Following previous research, policy positions are estimated using party manifesto data.70 
These data provide a useful indication of party positions since they represent the choices 
that the electorate faces before each election.  Moreover, as the content of party programs 
is often the result of intense intraparty debate, the CMP estimates should be reliable and 
accurate statements about parties’ positions at the time of elections. These measures are 
generally consistent with those from other party positioning studies, such as those based on 
expert placements, citizen perceptions of parties’ positions, and parliamentary voting 
analyses, which provides additional confidence in the validity and reliability of these 
estimates.71 The CMP measures are based on content analyses of the programmes of the 
main political parties at every post-war election. The policy statements in each (‘quasi-’) 
sentence are classified into fifty-six policy categories over seven policy domains. Following 
the traditional Laver/Budge methodology, the left-right scores of the various parties can be 
computed by summing up the percentages of all the sentences in the left category, and 
subtracting their total from the sum of the percentages of the sentences in the right 
category. The policy position of the Labour party is simply the sum of these scores. The 
policy difference between the parties is the difference between these two scores.  
To measure the social representation of the working class I use data from the Datcube 
project collected by the EurElite network. The Datacube is a major study of political 
representatives in Europe and contains information on the demographic background of 
                                                          
69 Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992 
70 Evans and Tilley 2012a; Ezrow and Xenokasis 2011 
71 Laver et al 2003 
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elected representatives since 1850.72  The data comes from a variety of sources, with the 
more recent data on Britain between 1964 and 2010 used in this article drawn from the 
Nuffield Election Series.73 The occupational background of MPs are classified into eleven 
distinct categories.  The working class composition of the main political parties is calculated 
as the proportion of MPs in each party from a working class background (including 
supervisors/foremen and skilled and unskilled workers). The social difference between the 
parties is simply the difference between these two scores from the previous election.  
Changing pattern of working class turnout in Britain  
The first task is simply to examine the association between class and turnout in Britain over 
time.  Figure 1 displays the probability of voting in a general election for each social class 
since the 1960s. The working class have always been somewhat less likely to vote than the 
salariat, and from 1964 to 2001 the difference between the two classes was fairly modest. 
Turnout bumped along, up and down, but the relative difference in turnout between the 
working class and the salariat did not change much, and turnout among both groups tended 
to increase and decrease in tandem. However, since 2001 the turnout between the two 
classes has sharply diverged, and whereas turnout has been on the increase among the 
middle classes since the low water mark of 2001, turnout among the working class has 
continued to fall. In 2010 the difference in reported turnout between the working class and 
salariat voting was 19 percentage points, compared to less than just 5 percentage points in 
1964. 
Figure 1 Reported turnout by class, 1964-2010  
Another way to look at these trends is to consider the relative impact of class on turnout. 
Figure 2 presents the log odds ratios for the association between class and turnout over 
time, and for the association between class and vote choice over time (Labour vs 
Conservative). Although it has been well documented that there has been a decline in the 
strength of class voting since the 1960s it has received less attention that there has also 
been an increase in the effect of class on turnout.74 Although the sharpest increase in class 
                                                          
72 See Best and Cotta 2000, Cotta and Best 2007 
73 See Butler and King 1965 on the 1964 election and Criddle 2010 for the latest edition in the series. 
74 Though see Evans and Tilley 2011 
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inequalities in turnout has taken place since 2001, there has been a pronounced upward 
trend since 1974, a period which Evans and Tilley also identify as being critical for the start 
of the weakening impact of class on vote choice.75 Moreover, by 2010 the logs odds of class 
on turnout were of a greater magnitude than they were for the association between class 
and vote choice. For the first time class is more important as a participatory cleavage than it 
is as an electoral cleavage.  
This represents an important milestone in British political history. Traditionally Britain was 
regarded as the class society, where class was pre-eminent among the factors used to 
explain party allegiance.76 In comparative terms, the impact of class on vote in Britain was 
unusually high – and this stood in stark contrast to the USA, where the impact of class on 
vote choice was unusually small, but the impact of class on turnout was unusually large.77 
Whereas discussion of class inequality and politics in the USA has long been concerned 
about the issue of participatory equality,78 this issue has tended not to receive much 
attention in Britain.  
One other noteworthy feature of Figure 2 is that there is a very strong relationship between 
the growth of class as participatory cleavage and the decline of class as an electoral 
cleavage. Moreover, there appears to be a slight lag to this relationship. The association 
between class voting and class turnout is not particularly strong when both indicators are 
measured contemporaneously (R2 = 0.24); but the association is very strong between the 
lag of class voting from t-1 and class turnout (R2 = 0.52). This indicates a process where the 
decline of class voting is temporally prior to the increase in class inequalities in turnout, and 
suggests that the two processes may be somehow linked, with a decline in the former 
leading to an in the increase in the latter. This provides a further justification to investigate 
how the factors associated with the decline in class voting have also shaped working class 
abstention. 
Figure 2 Vote and turnout by class, 1964-2010  
 
                                                          
75 Evans and Tilley 2012a 
76 Butler and Stokes 1974 
77 See Weakliem and Heath 1999 
78 Verba et al 1995 
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Changing party positions on left-right ideology  
One potential reason why the working class may have become disillusioned with voting is, 
as already discussed, to do with the structure of policy offerings between the two main 
parties. Figure 3 shows how the main parties in Britain have shifted their left-right policy 
positions over the last half a century. During the post war consensus of the 1950s and 1960s 
there was little ideological difference between the Conservative and Labour positions, 
though from the mid 1950s both parties moved right towards the centre ground. During the 
1970s the Labour party moved substantially to the left and stayed there for the best part of 
20 years, opening up a clear ideological divide between the two main parties. Since 1992, 
and in particular since 1994 when Tony Blair took over the leadership of the party there has 
been a process of policy convergence, with the Labour party moving towards the centre 
ground, and the Conservatives moving somewhat to the left. 
Figure 3:  Left-right positions of parties, 1950-2010 
Given that Labour has been moving steadily to the right since the 1992 election, and that 
turnout among the working class has been steadily declining since then, there is some prima 
facie evidence to support the idea that Labour’s move to the centre ground may have 
alienated working class voters and that policy convergence with the Conservatives may have 
also made the working class indifferent about voting. This combination of indifference and 
alienation could therefore potentially help to account for the increase in turnout inequality. 
However, this interpretation requires a somewhat selective reading of the data. During the 
1960s the Labour and Conservative party were also ideologically very close to each other 
and the Labour party also moved towards the right, albeit from a fairly left wing position, 
yet working class abstention was not particularly high. Moreover, during the 1980s, when 
the Labour was clearly on the left and there was also a substantial ideological divide with 
the Conservatives, working class abstention was not particularly low. Thus, although policy 
indifference and policy alienation may help to account for recent changes in the level of 
working class abstention, they appear less well equipped to account for the earlier patterns 
that we observe. 
Changing party representation of working class MPs  
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The next task then is to consider social representation, and examine how the social 
representation of the working class within the two main parties has changed over time. If 
the proportion of working class MPs within the Labour party has declined over time, then 
the social signals that the party sends voters about what group the party represents will also 
have become weaker,  leading to a hypothesized decline in working class turnout.  
Figure 4 depicts the changes that have taken place in the social background of Labour and 
Conservative MPs over the last 50 years. The number of MPs with a background in manual 
work has fallen dramatically (see Heath 2010). In 1964 over 37 per cent Labour MPs came 
from manual occupational backgrounds. By 2010 this fell to just under 10 per cent. These 
changes can be traced to institutional changes that were implemented by Kinnock in a bid to 
modernise the Labour party during the 1980s. As part of an effort to rebrand the party in 
order to appeal to middle class voters and distance the party from the working class 
radicalism that it had come to be associated with more and more middle class candidates 
were put forward. For example, in 1992 58 percent of incumbent Labour candidates thought 
of themselves as working class, compared to just 45 percent of newly selected candidates.79  
Figure 4 here 
The result of these changes has been a parliament with many fewer voices able to speak 
from working class experience, particularly on the Labour side of the House. Such changes in 
MPs’ occupational background have made parliament much less representative of the 
broader British population, and the Labour party much less representative of the working 
class whose interests it was traditionally supposed to represent. As the party has become 
more socially distant from its core supporters and adopted a more middle class party image 
it may be that the working class have become ‘socially alienated’, and as a result withdrawn 
from the electoral process.  
Turnout and working class abstention  
To test the hypotheses I link data on policy representation and social representation to 
pooled cross-sectional survey data, creating a hierarchical dataset in which individuals are 
nested within elections. I specify a multilevel logit model to estimate how the class-party 
                                                          
79 Data from Pippa Norris’s 1992 candidate study (see Norris and Lovenduski 1993). 
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association varies according to the structure of political choice. At level 1 is the individual 














where TURNOUT  is (1 = voted; 0 = did not vote) at election t, 0 is the constant, Class is the 
occupational background of the voter, POLDIF is the policy difference between the two main 
parties; Class*POLDIF is a cross-level interaction between class and policy difference, 
SOCDIF is the social difference between the two main parties from the previous election; 
and Class*SOCDIF is a cross-level interaction between class and social difference. I also 
examine the policy position of the Labour party and include controls for basic demographics, 
such as age, gender, housing tenure, and trade union membership, which previous research 
suggests is important for turnout.80 Finally I also control for the expected closeness of the 
contest, based on the average difference between the top two parties across all published 
opinion polls in the final month of the campaign.81 
In order to model the extent to which social classes differ in their voting behaviour I do not 
control for any attitudinal variables that may be endogenous to class at the individual level 
or policy difference and social difference at the party level, such as leadership evaluations, 
economic evaluations, or party identification. For example, social differences at the party 
level may influence party identification at the individual level, and so party ID may be a 
consequence of social differences (though see robustness checks).  
Five different models are specified. Model 1 is simply a baseline model of turnout which 
does not include any class-wise interactions; Model 2 specifies class-wise interactions to test 
the impact of  policy difference on class turnout; Model 3 tests the impact of Labour policy 
on class turnout; and Model 4 tests the impact of social difference on class turnout. Model 5 
tests the impact of social difference and labour policy simultaneously. The relevant 
parameter estimates from these models are reported in Tables 1 and 2. 
                                                          
80 Smets and van Ham 2013 
81 Data from 1965-1997 coms from Heath and Taylor (1999: 178); data from 2001 and 2005 comes from Heath 
(2007) and data from 2010 comes from the UK polling report.  
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Table 1 here 
The first model does not contain any class-wise interactions and simply presents a baseline 
model of turnout. The individual level variables and election related variables are all in the 
expected direction. The policy difference term is significant and in the expected direction – 
individuals are more likely to say they have voted when the two main parties adopt 
distinctive policy positions, and the political competition term is significant and in the 
expected direction – individuals are more likely to vote when the opinion polls suggest that 
the result will be close.  
However, of more interest from a theoretical point of view, is whether any of the election 
and party related variables interact with class in ways which might help to shed light on the 
increase in working class abstention. In order to test the policy indifference hypothesis 
Model 2 examines the impact that policy difference has on working class abstention by 
specifying an interaction term between policy difference and social class. With respect to 
the working class, the interaction is positive and in the expected direction but it is 
imprecisely estimated and does not reach conventional levels of significance (although the p 
value of 0.075 may charitably be regarded as significant at the 10 percent level). The 
findings are therefore at best suggestive. Working class people may be slightly more likely to 
abstain than the salariat when there is little policy difference between the parties, but in 
any case the magnitude of the effect is very small. We can illustrate this by computing the 
predicted probabilities of voting at different levels of policy difference. For example, Model 
2 predicts that working class abstention is about 5 percentage points greater than the 
salariat when the main parties adopt a distinctive policy platform (based on a CMP 
difference of 70, compared to the 1983 value of 68). By contrast the model predicts that 
working class abstention is about 9 percentage points greater than the salariat when the 
parties adopt a similar policy platform (based on a CMP difference of 10, compared to the 
2001 value of 9). There is thus some evidence, albeit weak, that the size of the ‘class gap’ in 
turnout is conditioned by the policy offerings of the two main parties, and that ‘policy 
indifference’ may have had a slightly greater impact on working class abstention than it has 
had on middle class abstention. 
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In order to test the policy alienation hypothesis, Model 3 examines the policy position of the 
Labour party and specifies an interaction term with class, while controlling for the level of 
policy difference between the two parties. The interaction with class is in the expected 
direction but is once again imprecisely estimated (p=0.084). Nonetheless there is some 
indication that working class people are slightly more likely to abstain than the salariat when 
the Labour party adopts a more right wing policy agenda. For example, Model 3 predicts 
that the difference between someone from the salariat voting and someone from the 
working class voting is about 3 percentage points if Labour adopts a very left wing policy 
position (based on a CMP score of -40, compared to the 1983 ‘longest suicide note in 
history’ value of -39). By contrast working class abstention is about 9 percentage points 
greater than the salariat if Labour adopts a right of centre policy position (based on a CMP 
score of 10, compared to the 2001 value of 6). These findings suggest that the working class 
in particular are slightly less likely to vote than the salariat when there is little policy 
difference between the parties or Labour party adopts a right of centre policy stance. 
However, the magnitude of the effect is relatively weak, and the findings are not particularly 
robust.82 We should therefore treat the results with caution. 
In Table 2 we turn to the social alienation hypothesis. Model 4 tests the impact of lagged 
social difference on turnout.83 The interaction term between social difference and the 
working class is highly significant (p=0.001) and in the expected direction. Working class 
people are significantly less likely than middle class people to vote when there is little social 
difference between the two parties. The interaction terms between the other class 
categories and social difference is also in the same direction, perhaps indicating that voters 
in those classes see working-class MPs as representing "ordinary people”. However the 
magnitude of these coefficients are somewhat smaller and less precisely estimated than the 
coefficient for the working class. Model 4 predicts that working class abstention is 16 points 
higher than middle class abstention if there is no social difference between the parties 
(based on a difference of 0, compared to the 2010 value of 8). But that working class 
abstention is just 3 points higher than middle class abstention when there are pronounced 
social differences between the parties (based on a difference of 40, compared to the 1964 
                                                          
82 If we specify the interactions simultaneously the results get washed out. 
83 The social difference variable is lagged so that it refers to the social composition of the parties at the time of 
the election (and is therefore based on the intake from the previous election).   
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value of 36). Class inequalities in turnout appear to respond to the social signals that parties 
send voters by having MPs from different social backgrounds. As Labour has become more 
middle class, the working class in particular have withdrawn from the political process.  
These results are robust to the inclusion of the main alternative hypotheses. Model 5 tests 
policy alienation and social alienation hypotheses simultaneously.84 The main results still 
stand up. 85 The magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction term between lagged social 
difference and working class is stable across models. These findings show that once we take 
social representation into account the strength of the class-turnout association does not 
vary by policy alienation (or policy indifference).  
Table 2 here 
We can get a clearer sense of the substantive impact of these findings by plotting the 
average marginal effects from the interaction between lagged social difference and class. 
Figure 5 plots the difference that we would predict between a working class person and a 
middle class person voting in a general election at different levels of lagged social difference 
between the two main parties. When parties are socially similar, model 5 predicts that the 
class gap in turnout is close to 16 percentage points. However, when parties are socially 
distinct and there are many working class MPs within the labour party this class gap shrinks 
to just under 3 percentage points.  
Figure 5 here 
As a robustness check Model 6 and 7 introduces a number of additional controls that might 
influence both turnout and class voting (Table 3). Model 6 controls for education. Data on 
education is not available for some of the early years so missing values are imputed.86 The 
                                                          
84 The results are very similar if the labour policy term is substituted with the policy difference term. 
85 I also substituted the lag variable of social representation (and associated interaction) with a linear time 
trend variable (results available on request). However, the model with the linear time trend provides a 
substantially worse fit to the data than the model with the lag of social representation. The difference in the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) between the two models is 12.66.When comparing models, a difference in 
BIC of 10 corresponds to the odds being 150:1 that the social representation model is the better fitting model 
and is considered “very strong” evidence in favour of the model (Raftery, 1995).  
86 The surveys in 1964, 1966, 1970 and 1974 do not contain straightforward or comparable data on education 
with latter surveys. Rather than dropping these surveys from the analysis missing values are imputed using the 
stata mi command with 10 imputed datasets. In a separate analysis (not shown) missing values were treated 
with the EM algorithm with much the same result. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient for 
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expansion of university education has increased the ‘cognitive sophistication’ of the 
electorate – and as a consequence may have made voters less reliant on either partisan or 
social cues.87 Model 7 also controls for the strength of party identification. It has been well 
documented that the strength of party identification has declined over time in the UK. 
Without strong partisan cues and habitual party loyalties those who lack the ‘cognitive skills’ 
to deal with politics may be less inclined to vote.88 Although the gentrification of the Labour 
party may have contributed - at least in part - to the decline of party identification, Model 7 
examines whether social cues still exert an influence on working class abstention even we 
control for partisan cues. 
Table 3 here 
As expected, controlling for education reduces the magnitude of the main effect for class, 
since the two variables are strongly related (people from working class backgrounds tend to 
be less likely to go to university; and people who go to university tend to be less likely to 
end up in working class occupations). However, the results of the analysis show that even 
with these added controls for education and party ID the main findings still hold; and that 
the magnitude of the class-gap in turnout is conditioned by the social distinctiveness of the 
two main parties. The magnitude of the coefficient is still substantively large and estimated 
with a high degree of precision (p=0.018). 
Conclusion 
There is a widespread belief that class has become less important in British politics, and so 
does not merit as much attention as it once did. This belief is false. While it is certainly true 
that class divisions are not as evident as they once were in terms of structuring vote choice, 
this is because class has been pushed outside the political system. Whereas previously the 
middle class and working class were divided on who to vote for, now they are divided on 
whether to bother voting at all. This finding is hard to reconcile with the old idea that a 
decline in class voting signified ‘the successful resolution by political systems of deep-seated 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
education and the interaction between lagged social difference and class is very similar across models that 
impute missing data and exclude missing data (dropping the early surveys from the analysis).   
87 Dalton 1984 
88 Dalton 1984, 2007, 2012 
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conflicts of social interests’.89 The working class have not become incorporated within the 
political system they have become more marginalised from it.90  
Recent studies on the dynamics of class voting have emphasised the political strategies of 
parties in shaping class divisions. In short, without party strategy that emphasizes or 
embodies class differences, class position is less likely to be strongly associated with party 
choice. But this doesn’t mean that class simply disappears. Rather the factors that have 
contributed to the decline of class as an electoral cleavage have also contributed to the 
emergence of class as a participatory cleavage. The two processes are inexorably linked. As 
the Labour party in particular has turned its back on the working class in a bid to appeal to 
middle class voters by recruiting more and more candidates from the professional classes, 
large swathes of the working class have simply stopped voting. Although this strategy has 
not hurt the Labour party electorally – and may even have paid off in terms of making them 
more electable in the eyes of middle class voters – it has done so at the cost of participatory 
equality.  
The results presented in this paper indicate that there is a strong over-time relationship 
between social representation and class inequalities in turnout. This could be because 
changes in the social background of Labour MPs have made working class people feel 
alienated from the party or indifferent about which party wins (or a combination of both). 
Without a strong social signal voters may also find it harder to decide which party best 
represents their interests, and so are confronted with an increasingly daunting set of 
evaluations. The over-time data is unable to shed much light on these different 
mechanisms, and we would need a different type of study to investigate them. However, 
there is now a growing body of experimental evidence to support the idea that the class 
background of candidates influences political attitudes, and that the working class in 
particular are most put-off by wealthy (middle class) candidates.91 There is also evidence to 
show that the working class have indeed become increasingly ‘alienated’ from the political 
system.92 One avenue for further research would therefore be to explore whether class and 
income profiles of candidates also influence more general feelings of political efficacy, which 
                                                          
89 van der Eijk et al 1992, 423 
90 See also Ford and Goodwin 2014 
91 See Campbell and Cowley 2014 
92 Ford and Goodwin 2014 
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would help to support the link between social alienation and turnout, and whether this link 
also operates at the constituency level. 
As the political choice perspective also makes clear, social divisions in politics are not fixed. 
And there is no reason why this trend of working class political exclusion cannot be 
reversed. There are now a much greater pool of working class voters who are electorally 
available and other parties may seek to court their vote. More generally these excluded 
voters represent fertile territory for populist parties. In the UK there is evidence that Ukip 
has found a way to connect with the disenfranchised working class,93 and if these attempts 
prove successful over time there is no reason why working class turnout should not increase 
again. 
                                                          
93 Ford and Goodwin 2014 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Reported turnout by class, 1964-2010 
 
Source: BES 1964-2010 
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Figure 2: Impact of class on vote choice and turnout (log odds), 1964-2010 
 
 
Notes: Log odds are based on a comparison of working class and salariat. Vote choice is 
based on a comparison of Labour and Conservative.  
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Figure 3:  Left-right positions of parties, 1950-2010 
 
Source: Manifesto Research Group (MRG). 
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Figure 4:  Working Class MPs in Britain, 1964-2010 
 
Source:  Datacube 
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Table 1:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Reported Turnout 




 B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. 
Age 0.063*** 0.005 0.063*** 0.005 0.063*** 0.005 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
Female 0.016 0.035 0.014 0.035 0.015 0.035 
Trade Union 0.316*** 0.042 0.314*** 0.042 0.312*** 0.042 
Housing tenure 0.423*** 0.035 0.423*** 0.035 0.424*** 0.035 
Social Class       
  Routine Non Manual -0.17*** 0.052 -0.256** 0.099 -0.193*** 0.058 
  Petty Bourgeois -0.395*** 0.073 -0.500*** 0.144 -0.396*** 0.084 
  Working Class -0.551*** 0.044 -0.676*** 0.084 -0.589*** 0.050 
Competitiveness -0.017 0.010 -0.018 0.010 -0.017 0.010 
Policy Difference 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.003 
Policy diff by Class        
  Policy diff by RNM   0.003 0.002   
  Policy diff by PB   0.003 0.004   
  Policy diff by WC   0.004 0.002   
Labour policy -0.016** 0.005 -0.016*** 0.005 -0.010 0.006 
Labour policy by Class        
  Lab policy by RNM     -0.004 0.005 
  Lab policy by PB     -0.001 0.007 
  Lab policy by WC     -0.007 0.004 
Constant -0.383 0.192 -0.290 0.215 -0.361 0.193 
Wald Chi Square 1067 (11)  1070 (14)  1070 (14)  
Log likelihood -12270  -12269  -12269  
Notes: Reference category is salariat. All models contain 12 surveys and 29,483 individuals. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
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Table 2:  Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting Reported Turnout 
 
 Model 4: 
Lagged Social difference 
Model 5: 
Labour policy 
 B S.E. B S.E. 
Age 0.062*** 0.005 0.062*** 0.005 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
Female 0.013 0.035 0.013 0.035 
Trade Union membership 0.299*** 0.042 0.299*** 0.042 
Housing tenure 0.430*** 0.035 0.431*** 0.035 
Social Class     
  Routine Non Manual -0.395*** 0.131 -0.421*** 0.145 
  Petty Bourgeois -0.596*** 0.204 -0.654*** 0.220 
  Working Class -0.892*** 0.113 -0.903*** 0.124 
Competitiveness -0.013** 0.004 -0.013** 0.004 
Policy Difference 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Lagged Social Difference 0.017*** 0.005 0.016** 0.006 
Lagged Social diff by Class      
  Lag Social diff by RNM 0.010 0.005 0.012 0.007 
  Lag Social diff by PB 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.010 
  Lag Social diff by WC 0.015*** 0.004 0.015** 0.006 
Labour policy -0.009*** 0.003 -0.010* 0.005 
Labour policy by Class      
  Lab policy by RNM   0.003 0.006 
  Lab policy by PB   0.004 0.009 
  Lab policy by WC   0.001 0.005 
Constant -0.640 0.177 -0.624 0.181 
Wald Chi Square 1162 (15)  1162 (18)  
Log likelihood -12256  -12255  
Notes: Reference category is salariat. All models contain 12 surveys and 29,483 individuals. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
P a g e  | 37 
 
Table 3:  Robustness checks: Multilevel Logistic Regression Models Predicting 
  Reported Turnout 
 
 Model 6: 
Lagged Social difference 
Model 7: 
Lagged Social difference 
 B S.E. B S.E. 
Age 0.063*** 0.005 0.064*** 0.005 
Age squared -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 
Female 0.010 0.035 0.009 0.035 
Trade Union membership 0.296*** 0.042 0.297*** 0.042 
Housing tenure 0.424*** 0.035 0.416*** 0.035 
Education 0.315*** 0.067 0.315*** 0.067 
Strength of party identification   0.107*** 0.017 
Social Class     
  Routine Non Manual -0.328* 0.146 -0.306* 0.146 
  Petty Bourgeois -0.547* 0.219 -0.530* 0.219 
  Working Class -0.776*** 0.126 -0.751*** 0.126 
Competitiveness -0.014*** 0.005 -0.015*** 0.005 
Policy Difference 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 
Labour Policy -0.011* 0.005 -0.011* 0.005 
Lagged Social Difference 0.015* 0.006 0.017** 0.006 
Lagged Social diff by Class      
  Lag Social diff by RNM 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.007 
  Lag Social diff by PB 0.012 0.009 0.011 0.009 
  Lag Social diff by WC 0.014* 0.006 0.013* 0.005 
Labour Policy by Class      
  Lab Policy diff by RNM 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.006 
  Lab Policy diff by PB 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.009 
  Lab Policy diff by WC 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.005 
Constant -0.766 0.189 -1.004 0.192 
Notes: Reference category is salariat. Models contain 13 surveys and 30,818 individuals. 
Missing values are imputed. Number of imputations = 10. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.005.  
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Figure 5   The class gap in turnout: predicted difference in turnout between the  
  working class and middle class by level of social difference between the 




Notes: These are predicted probabilities from Model 5 of Table 2, and refer to the difference 
in turnout between working class and middle class people. 
 
